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Copyright & Memes: The Fight for Success Kid
CATHAY Y. N. SMITH & STACEY LANTAGNE*
This Article explores the complicated relationship between memes and
copyright. Internet memes have become a ubiquitous part of social
communications. They effectively express an idea, message, or sentiment,
often more humorously and efficiently than words. Most memes evolved
from original content that Internet users found online and copied, altered,
shared, and imbued with new cultural and social meaning. Because memes
frequently involve the unauthorized use, alteration, and sharing of a content
creator’s original image or photograph, they naturally implicate the
content creator’s copyright. But who owns a meme? What rights, if any,
does the creator of the original content have in a meme derived from the
work? What rights, if any, do the users of the meme have? This Article
examines the current copyright case Griner v. King, involving the
unauthorized use of the highly popular Success Kid meme, to explore
doctrinal uncertainties involving copyright authorship and ownership,
abandonment, social media sharing and implied licensing, and fair use in
Internet memes.
INTRODUCTION
Internet memes have become a ubiquitous part of social
communications. Want to say something sarcastic to a friend? Say it with
the Condescending Wonka meme. 1 Feeling cranky? Share it in a Grumpy
Cat meme. 2 Want to express triumph about a trivial accomplishment? Do it
with the Success Kid meme. 3 Memes can effectively express an idea,
message, or sentiment, often more humorously and efficiently than words.
Most memes evolve from original content that Internet users find online and
copy, alter, share, and imbue with new cultural and social meaning. Because
memes frequently involve the unauthorized use, alteration, and sharing of a
content creator’s original image or photograph, they naturally implicate the
* © 2021, Cathay Y. N. Smith, Acting Dean, Academic Affairs & Professor of Law,
University of Montana Blewett School of Law; Stacey Lantagne, Associate Dean for
Faculty Development and Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi School of
Law. Dean Lantagne is grateful for the University of Mississippi School of Law Summer
Research Grants for enabling her authorship of this Article. The authors thank the
Intellectual Property Law Section of the Montana Bar and Professor Andrew Gilden
(Willamette University College of Law) and his Internet & Social Media Law students for
inviting us to share our research and thoughts in this Article. We also thank the editors of
The Georgetown Law Journal Online for their excellent editing and thoughtful comments.
1
10 Most Popular Internet Memes (In History), BROADBAND SEARCH, https://www.
broadbandsearch.net/blog/most-popular-internet-memes-in-history [https://perma.cc/JM5
E-2WYW] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
2
Id.
3
Id.
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content creator’s copyright. But who owns a meme? What rights, if any,
does the creator of the original content have in a meme derived from the
original work? This Article explores the complicated relationship between
memes and copyright. It focuses on the current copyright case Griner v.
King, which involves the unauthorized use of the popular Success Kid
meme, to examine doctrinal uncertainties of copyright authorship and
ownership, abandonment, social media and implied licensing, and fair use
in Internet memes.
This Article proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the history of the
photograph used in the Success Kid meme and the process in which that
photograph became a popular meme. Part II details the current litigation
between the photographer of the Success Kid photograph and former
Congressperson Steve King over King’s unauthorized use of Success Kid to
fundraise for his political campaign. Parts III and IV analyze two defenses
raised by King in the litigation—copyright abandonment and licensing—
and examine whether Griner in this case, and content creators in general,
abandon copyright in their content or license their works to the public when
their original content becomes a meme. Parts V and VI use the Griner v.
King litigation to explore two additionally important copyright questions
confronting the relationship between copyright and memes. Specifically,
Part V focuses on the collaborative nature of memes to suggest
distinguishing memes from photographs when determining copyright
ownership and infringement. Part VI examines copyright fair use and
whether the use of an original image as a meme can be considered
transformative fair use.
I. THE STORY OF SUCCESS KID
On August 26, 2007, Laney Griner took a photograph of her elevenmonth-old son Sam at the beach. 4 Like many parents, she was hoping for a
cherubic smile but instead got a different expression. Sam, hand clenched
in a fist, looks “smug,” 5 “determined,” 6 “satisfied,” 7 “victor[ious],” 8
“pugnacious.” 9 Griner later provided context to the photo, explaining that
Success Kid / I Hate Sandcastles, KNOW YOUR MEME [hereinafter Success Kid, KNOW
YOUR MEME] https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/success-kid-i-hate-sandcastles [https://
perma.cc/GNS8-DZ4Q] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021).
5
Id.
6
Ed Payne, ‘Success Kid’ Appeals to Social Media to Get His Dad a Kidney Transplant,
CNN (Apr. 15, 2015, 4:30 AM), https://www.cnn.com/2015/04/15/living/success-kid-dadneeds-help/ [https://perma.cc/Y9WN-UQQX].
7
Id.
8
Sydney Lupkin, Success Kid’s Dad Needs a Kidney Transplant, ABC NEWS (Apr. 14,
2015, 9:57 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/internet-success-kids-dad-kidneytransplant/story?id=30288035 [https://perma.cc/8LSX-2UTQ].
9
Gillian Mohney, Dad of ‘Success Kid’ Undergoes Successful Kidney Transplant, ABC
NEWS (Aug. 18, 2015, 4:57 PM), https://abcnews.go.com/Health/dad-success-kid4
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Sam was eating sand, 10 but people viewing the photo on Griner’s Flickr
account apparently had other ideas about what the photo means. 11 Griner’s
photograph of her son became the popular meme known as Success Kid.

The word “meme” was originally coined by evolutionary biologist
Richard Dawkins to describe any “unit of cultural transmission” that stays
alive by “leaping from brain to brain.” 12 It has since been co-opted to
describe images, videos, or texts that are copied and spread rapidly by
people online. 13 Some memes are created to circulate a specific idea or
message. 14 Most memes, however, involve content that people find online
and transform into memes by imbuing that content with new meanings,
messages, and cultural contexts. 15 The most common format of an Internet
meme involves an image that is combined with a relevant catchphrase or
text. 16 The Success Kid meme, which follows this common format, features
undergoes-successful-kidney-transplant/story?id=33159971
[https://perma.cc/K9A2TKSZ].
10
Lupkin, supra note 8.
11
Id.
12
RICHARD DAWKINS, THE SELFISH GENE 249 (40th anniversary ed. 2016).
13
See Olivia Solon, Richard Dawkins on the Internet’s Hijacking of the Word ‘Meme,’
WIRED (June 20, 2013, 12:00 PM), https://www.wired.co.uk/article/richard-dawkinsmemes [https://perma.cc/5XZM-GNY6].
14
Examples include the Happy Merchant cartoon portraying the profile of a man used to
express anti-Semitic ideas, and the NPC Wojak image of a bald man with a blank stare used
to denigrate “people who do not think for themselves.” Happy Merchant, KNOW YOUR
MEME, https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/happy-merchant [https://perma.cc/E7QAVE5L] (last visited Sept. 10, 2021); NPC Wojak, KNOW YOUR MEME,
https://knowyourmeme.com/memes/npc-wojak [https://perma.cc/ELN7-TKXM] (last
visited Sept. 11, 2021).
15
See David Nield, 6 Easy Ways to Make Your Own Memes, WIRED (May 30, 2021, 8:00
AM), https://www.wired.com/story/6-easy-ways-make-memes/ [https://perma.cc/Y8BJN35F].
16
See Katherine Gallagher, 50 Famous Memes and What They Mean, STACKER (Aug. 5,
2021), https://stacker.com/stories/2650/50-famous-memes-and-what-they-mean [https://
perma.cc/M7HM-SMV4].
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the image of Sam either with the original blurred beach background or
superimposed over a blue sunbeam background with text added to the top
and bottom of the frame.
Griner’s photograph of Sam quickly became famous on the Internet. By
the beginning of 2008, Griner’s photograph was already being used as the
basis for a MySpace layout. 17 A few years later, the photo got a boost when
it was uploaded to a Reddit community called “r/AdviceAnimals,” which
specializes in posting images with the potential to catch on as culturally
popular memes. 18 One commenter remarked that the image was
“underrated,” 19 with another stating that Sam “still has potential.” 20 The
photo fulfilled its potential. A month after being posted to Reddit, there
were more than 66,000 instances of Success Kid as a meme on
Quickmeme, 21 a site that encourages the pasting of captions on photos to
create memes. The overwhelming interpretation of the photo was to use it
to illustrate successes, victories, and triumphs, hence the name Success
Kid. 22 By that summer, there were entire blogs dedicated to collecting
instances of the meme. 23 A few years later, CNN deemed Sam Griner “the
Internet’s most famous baby.” 24 ABC News reporter Sydney Lupkin’s
assessment was, “If you’ve spent any time on the Internet in the past few
years, you’ve come across the Success Kid meme . . . .” 25
After the photo achieved epic meme status, Griner successfully
monetized its fame, licensing the photograph to Vitamin Water and Virgin
Mobile for their use in advertisements. 26 Griner also licensed official
Success Kid merchandise. 27 She further used the meme to raise money for
Success Kid, KNOW YOUR MEME, supra note 4; Payne, supra note 6.
poringo, Success Kid Finds a Controller, REDDIT, https://www.reddit.com
/r/AdviceAnimals/comments/farnt/success_kid_finds_a_controller/
[https://perma.cc/
B324-6A82] (last visited July 29, 2021).
19
Comment to Success Kid Finds a Controller, REDDIT, (Jan. 28, 2011, 11:56 AM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/AdviceAnimals/comments/farnt/success_kid_finds_a_controlle
r/c1ek0zz?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3 [https://perma.cc/B3246A82].
20
poringo, Comment to Success Kid Finds a Controller, REDDIT, (Jan. 28, 2011, 01:01
PM),
https://www.reddit.com/r/AdviceAnimals/comments/farnt/success_kid_finds_a_
controller/c1ekbh6?utm_source=share&utm_medium=web2x&context=3 [https://perma.
cc/B324-6A82].
21
Success Kid, KNOW YOUR MEME, supra note 4.
22
Interestingly, the meaning of the meme has morphed over time. It was initially known
as “I’m gonna F you up” and then “I Hate Sandcastles,” interpreted in violent, bullying
ways. Lupkin, supra note 8; Karen Feagins, ‘Success Kid’ Is from Jacksonville, WJCT
PUBLIC MEDIA (Apr. 5, 2013), https://news.wjct.org/post/success-kid-jacksonville
[https://perma.cc/GR53-CX5W].
23
Success Kid, KNOW YOUR MEME, supra note 4.
24
Payne, supra note 6.
25
Lupkin, supra note 8.
26
Feagins, supra note 22.
27
Id.
17
18
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her husband’s kidney-related medical care, raising more than $83,000 via a
GoFundMe campaign for the “sick father of the ‘Success Kid’ meme.” 28
The meme was also used in a political context when the Obama
Administration used it to promote immigration reform. 29 The
Administration obtained Griner’s permission for its use of the meme. 30
II. STEVE KING’S UNAUTHORIZED USE OF SUCCESS KID
In January 2020, the Success Kid meme appeared on Congressperson
Steve King’s campaign fundraising pages on Facebook as well as on
WinRed, a Republican fundraising website that King used for his political
campaign. 31 The image of a seemingly determined Sam, his fist raised, is
superimposed over an image of the U.S. Capitol. 32 Added to the top of the
frame were the words “Fund our memes!!!” 33 This fundraising
advertisement linked to a platform accepting financial donations to King’s
campaign for Congress. 34 At that time, King was serving as the U.S.
Representative for Iowa’s fourth congressional district and running for
reelection. 35 King was an extremely divisive and controversial politician
with a documented history of racist and xenophobic comments and insults. 36
He publicly promoted white nationalists and neo-Nazis on social media 37
and infamously asked in an interview, “White nationalist, white
supremacist, Western civilization—how did that language become

Harry Readhead, ‘Success Kid’ Fundraising Target Smashed After Redditor Posts Metro
Article, METRO (Apr. 15, 2015, 5:30 PM), https://metro.co.uk/2015/04/15/success-kidfundraising-target-smashed-after-redditor-posts-metro-article-5151979/.
29
Allyson Chiu, ‘Vile Man’: Mother of ‘Success Kid’ Demands Republican Steve King
Stop Using Son’s Picture, INDEPENDENT (Jan. 28, 2020, 4:39 PM), https://www.
independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/us-politics/success-kid-meme-steve-kingcampaign-iowa-mom-a9306211.html [https://perma.cc/GC4A-WUBL].
30
Id.
31
Alan Yuhas, Mother of ‘Success Kid’ Demands Steve King Stop Using His Meme, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 28, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/01/28/us/politics/steve-kingsuccess-kid-meme.html.
32
Id.
33
Id.
34
Id.
35
See Barbara Sprunt, Iowa Rep. Steve King, Known for Racist Comments, Loses
Reelection Bid, NPR (June 3, 2021, 12:03 AM), https://www.npr.org/2020/06/03/
865823546/iowa-rep-steve-king-ousted-in-gop-primary-ap-projects
[https://perma.cc/RE2X-6M9F].
36
Trip Gabriel, A Timeline of Steve King’s Racist Remarks and Divisive Actions, N.Y.
TIMES (June 15, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/15/us/politics/steve-kingoffensive-quotes.html.
37
See id.; Christopher Mathias, Republican Rep. Steve King Retweets a Known White
Supremacist on Twitter… Again, HUFFPOST (Sept. 12, 2018, 4:58 PM),
https://www.huffpost.com/entry/steve-king-tweets-white-nationalist-lana-lokteff_n_
5b995994e4b0511db3e8a0fc [https://perma.cc/CRV8-CB9R].
28
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offensive?” 38 King’s rhetoric was so extreme that he garnered bipartisan
criticism and censure, including in January 2019 when the Republicans
stripped him of his House committee assignments. 39 A year later, Griner
found her photograph being used to solicit funds for King’s reelection
campaign. 40

Griner immediately turned to social media to denounce King and his
campaign’s unauthorized use of her photograph, making it clear that
“neither I, my son, nor ‘Success Kid’ have any affiliation with
Representative King, nor would we have ever agreed to this use. I do not
endorse Representative King and, like most people, I strongly disagree with
his views.” 41 She made statements to the media calling out King’s “bigotry”
and explained that she would “never attach her son’s face willingly to any
negative ad, but Steve King is just the worst of the worst.” 42 Griner’s
attorney followed up with a cease-and-desist letter to King and his
campaign, 43 and on December 30, 2020, Griner filed suit against King, his

Trip Gabriel, Before Trump, Steve King Set the Agenda for the Wall and Anti-immigrant
Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 10, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/10/us/politics/
steve-king-trump-immigration-wall.html.
39
Trip Gabriel, Jonathan Martin & Nicholas Fandos, Steve King Removed from Committee
Assignments over White Supremacy Remark, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 14, 2019),
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/01/14/us/politics/steve-king-white-supremacy.html.
40
See Yuhas, supra note 31.
41
Laney Griner (@laneymg), TWITTER (Jan. 27, 2020, 3:49 PM), https://twitter.
com/laneymg/status/1221898122928033797 [https://perma.cc/P438MXUR].
42
Yuhas, supra note 31.
43
Stephanie K. Baer, The Mom of “Success Kid” Sent Rep. Steve King a Cease-and-Desist
Letter for Using the Meme in an Ad, BUZZFEED NEWS (Jan. 27, 2020, 5:47 PM), https://
www.buzzfeednews.com/article/skbaer/success-kid-meme-steve-king-ad [https://perma.
cc/533H-B4N5].
38
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campaign, and WinRed, alleging, among other claims, copyright
infringement. 44
In the complaint, Griner charges King with willfully infringing her
copyright in the photograph when King reproduced it on his campaign
fundraising pages on Facebook and WinRed “for the express purpose of
soliciting money for King’s congressional re-election campaign.” 45 As the
author and copyright holder of her photograph, Griner has the exclusive
right to reproduce, distribute, display, and create derivative works of her
copyrighted work. 46 In addition to asserting a copyright infringement claim,
Griner in her complaint highlights King’s reputation for making “racist
comments that lost him the support of many Republican leaders” and for
being “widely rebuked by party leadership” and called “unworthy of his
elected position.” 47 Griner acknowledges that her photograph of Sam
“quickly gained widespread popularity and became an Internet ‘meme’
through millions of people non-commercially posting the Photograph on
their social media accounts . . . .” 48 She also claims to have licensed her
photograph “commercially to legitimate advertisers including Coca-Cola,
General Mills, Microsoft, Vitamin Water, Hot Topic, Virgin Mobil [sic],
and many others wishing to associate their messaging with the Photograph’s
uplifting success theme.” 49
This is not the first time that a content creator has filed suit for
unauthorized uses of the content as a meme. In 2018, Matt Furie sued Alex
Jones’ Infowars for its unauthorized use of Pepe the Frog. 50 Furie had
created Pepe, a green anthropomorphic frog, as a character in the comic
book series Boy’s Club. 51 Furie’s Pepe is “mellow,” “chill,” “pretty good
natured,” and liked “hanging out, playing pranks . . . , eating pizza, [and]
44
See Complaint at 5, Griner v. King, No. 20-CV-3848 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2020) [hereinafter
Complaint]. In addition to copyright infringement, Griner added a claim under the Digital
Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C. § 1202, which prohibits the “removal or alteration
of copyright management information” such as the name of the author of a work. Id.
paras. 31-34. Laney Griner’s son Sam further asserted a claim against the defendants for
their unauthorized use of his likeness. See id. paras. 35-40. This Article will focus on the
copyright infringement claim.
45
Id. para. 20.
46
See Burrow-Giles Lithographic Co. v. Sarony, 111 U.S. 53, 57–58 (1884) (“author . . .
is ‘he to whom anything owes its origin; originator; maker;’ . . . the nature of copyright . .
. was . . . the exclusive right of a man to the production of his own genius or intellect.”).
See also 17 U.S.C. § 106. Griner also registered her photograph with the U.S. Copyright
Office, and this registration allowed her to file this copyright infringement suit. See §
411(a).
47
Complaint, supra note 44, para. 9.
48
Id. para. 15.
49
Id. para. 16.
50
Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 956 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
51
Giaco Furino, Pepe the Frog’s Creator Talks Making Zine History, VICE (Aug. 3, 2016,
12:25 PM), https://www.vice.com/en_us/article/qkw97d/pepe-frog-creator-matt-furietalks-zine-history [https://perma.cc/75PL-MU4J].
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partying.” 52 Memes of Pepe quickly went viral. Earlier on, Internet users
shared memes of Pepe to express melancholy, anger, or surprise. 53 But then
the alt-right segment of the white supremacist movement co-opted Pepe by
recreating him “to appear with a Hitler-like mustache, wearing a skullcap
or a Ku Klux Klan hood” and used him “in hateful messages aimed at
Jewish and other users on Twitter.” 54 Pepe was also recreated on Infowars,
the Daily Stormer, and other alt-right media or neo-Nazi websites. 55 Pepe
the Frog became so symbolic of the extremist white supremacist movement
that his image was added to the Anti-Defamation League’s hate symbols
database. 56 Furie filed multiple Digital Millennium Copyright Act
takedown requests to remove racist, anti-Semitic, or alt-right propagandized
uses of Pepe. 57 He eventually sued Infowars for its unauthorized use and
commercial sale of Pepe in a Make America Great Again (MAGA) poster. 58
In Furie v. Infowars, LLC, Infowars raised a number of defenses, including
that Furie had abandoned his copyright to Pepe, Infowars had an implied
license to use Pepe, and Infowars’ use of Pepe in the MAGA poster was fair
use. 59 That case eventually settled, with Infowars paying Furie $15,000 after
the court declined to dismiss Furie’s copyright claim on summary
judgment. 60
In response to Griner’s claims, King filed a motion to dismiss, 61 arguing
similar points to the ones that Infowars raised in Furie. 62 Specifically, King
Adam Serwer, It’s Not Easy Being Meme, ATLANTIC (Sept. 13, 2016), https://www.
theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2016/09/its-not-easy-being-green/499892/.
53
Imad Khan, 4chan’s Pepe the Frog Is Bigger Than Ever—and His Creator Feels Good,
Man, DAILY DOT (May 29, 2021, 2:29 AM), https://www.dailydot.com/unclick/4chanpepe-the-frog-renaissance/ [https://perma.cc/P8SF-T4E2].
54
Christopher Mele, Pepe the Frog Meme Listed as a Hate Symbol, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/09/28/us/pepe-the-frog-is-listed-as-a-hate-symbolby-the-anti-defamation-league.html.
55
Liam Stack, Infowars Agrees to Part Ways with Pepe the Frog, N.Y. TIMES (June 10,
2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/06/10/us/pepe-frog-infowars-alt-right.html.
56
See Pepe the Frog, ADL, https://www.adl.org/education/references/hate-symbols/pepethe-frog [https://perma.cc/G2JN-WCZU] (last visited Sept. 12, 2021); Mele, supra note 54.
57
Aja Romano, To Save Pepe the Frog from the Alt-right, His Creator Has Invoked
Copyright Law’s Darker Side, VOX (Sept. 21, 2017, 11:40 AM), https://www.vox.
com/culture/2017/9/21/16333162/pepe-the-frog-alt-right-dmca-takedown-fair-use-mattfurie [https://perma.cc/L3FT-4HN6].
58
See Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
59
See id. at 956.
60
See id.; Scott Neuman, Alex Jones to Pay $15,000 in Pepe the Frog Copyright
Infringement Case, NPR (June 11, 2019, 4:11 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/06/11/
731520403/alex-jones-to-pay-15-000-in-pepe-the-frog-copyright-infringement-case
[https://perma.cc/L58M-2T8W].
61
See Motion to Dismiss, Griner v. King, No. 20-CV-3848 (D.D.C. Dec. 30, 2020)
[hereinafter King’s Motion]. On June 23, 2021, the case was transferred to the District
Court for the Northern District of Iowa and, on July 21, 2021, King refiled the same motion
to dismiss. See Griner v. King, No. 21-cv-04024 (N.D. Iowa, June 23, 2021). On October
20, 2021, the court denied King’s motion to dismiss. See id.
62
See Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 956.
52
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argues that Griner does not own a copyright in her photograph of Sam
because she had “abandoned” it. 63 He also argues that, even if Griner owns
the copyright in the photograph, King has permission, or a “license,” to use
Griner’s photograph. 64 King’s defenses are examples of arguments that are
likely to become common in copyright claims involving the unauthorized
use of content as memes. Given memes’ increasing popularity as a medium,
collaborative and transformative nature, and propensity for being
appropriated for commercial and political uses, one can anticipate that
disputes involving memes will only increase in the future. The following
two Parts of this Article analyze King’s two main arguments.
III. ABANDONING COPYRIGHTS IN MEMES
One of the defenses that King raises in his motion is copyright
abandonment. Copyright abandonment is a copyright owner’s “intentional
relinquishment” of copyright in a copyrighted work. 65 King argues, for
instance, that “Griner released the . . . Image into the public domain,” and
that “Griner purportedly authored the . . . Image in 2007, gave it away, and
sat on her hands for many years.” 66 Although his motion never uses the term
“copyright abandonment,” King does claim that Griner “abandoned her
right to these copies[,]” appearing to argue that Griner had abandoned the
copyright in her photograph, thereby placing it into the public domain. 67
There is precedent for this argument. As discussed above, in Furie, Infowars
raised the same argument against Furie—that he had abandoned his
copyright in the image of Pepe the Frog. 68
When an author abandons the copyright, the author relinquishes all
rights and control over the work, thereby placing it into the public domain. 69
An “original work[] of authorship is copyrighted as soon as it is “fixed in
any tangible medium.” 70 This means that an author’s work is automatically
protected by copyright, in most cases for “the life of the author and 70 years
after the author’s death,” 71 regardless of whether the author desired this
protection. 72 Copyright abandonment, on the other hand, requires “both (1)
See King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 4–5, 9, 25.
Id. at 4–5, 26–27.
65
Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 965 (quoting A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d
1004, 1026 (9th Cir. 2001)).
66
King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 25.
67
See Order Denying Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss at 13, Griner v. King, No. 21-CV4024 (N.D. Iowa Oct. 20, 2021) [hereinafter Order].
68
See Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 964–65.
69
See Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The Right to Abandon, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 355, 391 (2010)
(“Once a copyrighted work is dedicated to the public domain, it can never be privately
owned again.”).
70
17 U.S.C. § 102(a).
71
Id. § 302(a).
72
Dave Fagundes & Aaron Perzanowski, Abandoning Copyright, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV.
487, 490 (2020).
63
64
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an intent by the copyright owner to surrender the rights and (2) an overt act
showing that intent.” 73 Examples of “an overt act” include copyright
owners’ signing an “Abandonment of Copyright” document stating that
they “hereby abandon our copyright,” 74 gifting the copyrighted work to the
Library of Congress and “dedicat[ing] to the public all rights, including
copyrights throughout the world . . . in this collection,” 75 and including a
statement in a published work’s copyright notice that the copyright will
expire on a specific time and date. 76 The “mere inaction” to police
unauthorized uses of a copyrighted work is typically not enough to
constitute an overt act evidencing intent to abandon copyright. 77 Most of
the facts that King includes in his motion to support his copyright
abandonment argument relate to the extensive and unauthorized third-party
uses of Griner’s copyrighted work as a meme. For example, King argues:
Griner told the world, in no uncertain terms, that she was
glad that her son’s image achieved popularity. The world
took her at her word and fabricated one-offs at a pace that
only computers could track. Laney Griner not only
approves of third party uses of the . . . Image, she
comments on them, she reposts them, she provides links
to users to acquire template versions of the . . . Image. 78

If this were enough to find copyright abandonment, then copyright to
any content that has become famous on the Internet or become a meme
would be considered abandoned and the content entered into the public
domain. But there is certainly a difference between a copyright owner
“making a work accessible to the public on a limited basis” and the
copyright owner’s “wholesale relinquishment of control over the work.” 79
The popularity of a copyrighted work does not destroy the creator’s
copyright interest in the work. 80

Order, supra note 67, at 13; see also id. at 493.
Id. at 541–42 (citing Bates v. Keirsey, No. D041368, 2004 WL 2850153 (Cal. Ct. App.
Dec. 13, 2004)).
75
Id. at 542 (citing First Amended Complaint, Highsmith v. Getty Images, Inc., No. 1:16cv-05924-JSR (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 17, 2016)).
76
See id. (citing Hadady Corp. v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 1392, 1396
(C.D. Cal. 1990)).
77
Id. at 540 (citing Hampton v. Paramount Pictures Corp., 279 F.2d 100, 104 (9th Cir.
1960); Dodd, Mead & Co. v. Lilienthal, 514 F. Supp. 105, 108 (S.D.N.Y. 1981)).
78
See King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 4–5.
79
Fagundes & Perzanowski, supra note 72, at 545.
80
Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (quoting United
Feature Syndicate, Inc. v. Koons, 817 F. Supp. 370, 380–81 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)) (“[N]o
matter how popular a character may become, the copyright owner is entitled to guard
against the unauthorized commercial exploitation of that character.”).
73
74
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Although the failure to police a copyrighted work would not alone be
an overt act indicating intent to abandon, 81 courts have considered public
statements by copyright owners to support abandonment. For instance, in
Furie, the court considered whether public statements made by Pepe the
Frog’s creator supported his intent to abandon copyright to Pepe. 82
Specifically, in interviews with the media, Furie stated that he “believe[d]
in supporting people’s decision to profit off of Pepe in order to provide them
with the most positive business experience possible.” 83 Furie also said that
he “realized that Pepe is beyond [his] control . . . [Pepe is] like a kid, he
grew up and now I have to set him free to live his life.” 84 Furie
acknowledged that “it’s just out of my control, what people are doing with
[Pepe], and my thoughts on it, are more of amusement.” 85 Eventually, Furie
publicly “killed Pepe” 86 because “associations of Pepe got interwoven with
some kind of Neo-Nazi or Alt Right agenda. [Pepe] had become, in the eyes
of some, a mascot for hate groups.” 87 Nevertheless, because the
determination of whether a copyright owner has abandoned copyright
“turns on his intent as evidenced by how his public statements should be
interpreted,” the court denied summary judgment on the issue of
abandonment in Furie. 88 Similarly, Marya v. Warner/Chappell Music, Inc.
involved the copyright to the lyrics of the popular song Happy Birthday. 89
In Marya, the court indicated that a statement by the copyright owner to
have “long ago resigned herself to the fact that her [copyrighted] ditty had
become common property of the nation” would, if believed, be an “overt
act on which a reasonable fact finder could base a finding that [the copyright
owner] abandoned her copyright interest in the lyrics.” 90 But again, the
court in that case found triable issues of fact precluding summary
judgment. 91 In both Marya and Furie, however, the court appeared willing
to entertain the argument that certain public statements made by the
copyright owner could support an intent to abandon copyright. 92 However,
in cases involving factual disputes and conflicting statements by the
See Order, supra note 67, at 13 (“Failure to object or to act has usually not shown ‘intent
to relinquish’ the rights, however.”).
82
See id. at 965–66.
83
Id. at 965. Furie claimed that this response “was made ‘sarcastically.’” Id.
84
Id.
85
Id.
86
James Vincent, Pepe the Frog Is Officially Dead, VERGE (May 8, 2017, 7:43 AM),
https://www.theverge.com/2017/5/8/15577340/pepe-the-frog-is-dead-matt-furie
[https://perma.cc/U82B-YCTM] (“Pepe the Frog’s battles are finally over. Cartoonist Matt
Furie has officially killed off his most famous creation . . . .”).
87
Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 966.
88
Id. at 966–67. The case settled. Neuman, supra note 60.
89
131 F. Supp. 3d 975, 982 (C.D. Cal. 2015).
90
Id. at 992–93.
91
Id. at 993.
92
See Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 965–66 (finding genuine dispute of material fact as to
whether public statements demonstrate abandonment); Marya, 131 F. Supp. 3d at 993
(finding paraphrased quote from journalist insufficient evidence for directed verdict).
81
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copyright owner, at least one court has said that it is more appropriate for a
jury than the court to determine the copyright owner’s intent. 93
In King’s motion, he supports his copyright abandonment argument by
quoting Griner’s public statements supporting third-party uses of Success
Kid:
Initially, I didn’t like the attention and it felt like a
violation. I would contact people, insisting they remove
the . . . Image immediately. No one ever did. So I was sort
of forced to see the experience differently, it became a
fun, positive, exciting thing, and, if nothing else, a really
cool story for Sam to tell one day. It’s nice to know you’ve
made people smile a little. It’s been an amazing and fun
experience. Without it, we’d never get to do such
awesome things . . . . 94

Is this public statement an overt act evidencing Griner’s intent to
abandon her copyright in her photograph of her son? Copyright
abandonment is irrevocable and results in a total relinquishment of control
and loss of any potential income from the copyrighted work. 95 Because of
the serious consequences of abandonment, the threshold for finding intent
to abandon copyright is appropriately high. 96 Statements made by a
copyright owner celebrating the popularity of the copyrighted work should
not be enough to abandon copyright in the work. Because of the serious
consequences of abandoning copyright, an overt act should not be found
unless there is “a document expressly memorializ[ing] the copyright
holder’s intent to relinquish their rights.” 97 In this case, even if Griner’s
public statement could somehow support her intent to abandon copyright,
statements that King made in his motion actually contradict his own
argument. For instance, King claims in his motion that Griner gave the
image away and sat on her hands. 98 But in that same motion, he claims that
“Griner pesters companies for payments for use of the . . . Image post hoc
. . . . Overall Griner’s licensing pursuits resemble a shake down more so
than traditional negotiation.” 99 That alleged behavior is certainly not
consistent with someone who has intentionally relinquished all of her rights
in her work. Indeed, the Griner court agreed: it denied King’s motion to
dismiss, finding that Griner’s “licensing behavior shows that she did not
commit any overt act that showed an intent to surrender her rights in the
work.” 100
See Furie, 401 F. Supp. 3d at 966–68.
King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 9.
95
See Fagundes & Perzanowski, supra note 72, at 552.
96
Id.
97
Id.
98
See King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 3–4.
99
Id. at 3.
100
Order, supra note 67, at 14.
93
94
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IV. SOCIAL MEDIA SHARING AND IMPLIED LICENSING
Another argument made by King in his motion concerns the licensing
of the photograph and advances two arguments: (1) by posting the
photograph to Facebook and Instagram, allegedly per the social media sites’
terms of use, Griner had granted an express license for all users—including
King—to do whatever they wished with the photograph; 101 or, in the
alternative, (2) even if the specific terms of use did not support an express
license, Griner’s conduct in posting the photograph to the Internet and
allowing some people to use it as a meme manifested an implied license that
all Internet users could do whatever they wished with the photograph. 102
Both arguments miss the mark. 103
Memes are frequently derived from content that creators post and share
publicly, sometimes on social media websites such as Twitter, Facebook,
and Instagram. In the terms governing the use of their respective platforms,
both Facebook and Instagram are careful to state that users continue to own
all of the intellectual property rights—including copyright—to everything
uploaded to the sites. 104 Therefore, Griner continues to own the copyright
in the photograph, regardless of whether she posted it on Facebook or
Instagram. In uploading the content, however, Griner did grant licenses to
both Instagram and Facebook. 105 However, both of those licenses are
expressly limited by the websites’ respective terms of use, particularly
because the license is granted to the individual platform companies. 106 That
See id. at 4 (“Both Facebook and Instagram acquire non-exclusive copyright licenses
for all content posted on them, including with a right to further sublicense content.”).
102
See id. at 4–5.
103
The court in its order denying King’s motion to dismiss does not squarely assess these
arguments because it finds that Griner’s allegation of unauthorized use was sufficient to
survive the motion. See Order, supra note 67, at 11.
104
Terms of Service, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/terms.php [https://perma.cc/
L8F9-RD4C] (last visited Sept. 11, 2021) (“You own the intellectual property rights (things
like copyright or trademarks) in any such content that you create and share on
Facebook . . . . Nothing in these Terms takes away the rights you have to your own
content.”); Terms of Use, INSTAGRAM, https://www.instagram.com/about/legal/terms/
before-january-19-2013/ [https://perma.cc/ELP5-E47W] (last visited Sept. 11, 2021)
(“Instagram does NOT claim ANY ownership rights in the text, files, images, photos,
video, sounds, musical works, works of authorship, applications, or any other materials . . .
that you post on or through the Instagram Services.”).
105
The motion’s focus on Facebook and Instagram is odd because originally Griner posted
the photograph to Flickr, and Flickr’s terms of use would therefore seem to be the relevant
terms governing the original posting of the photograph. See Lupkin, supra note 8.
However, Griner has reposted the photograph to Facebook and Instagram, as stated in the
motion, bringing Facebook’s and Instagram’s terms of use into play as well. See King’s
Motion, supra note 61, at 4.
106
FACEBOOK, supra note 104 (“[Y]ou grant us a . . . license . . . .” (emphasis added));
INSTAGRAM, supra note 104 (“[Y]ou . . . grant to Instagram a . . . license . . . .” (emphasis
added)).
101
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renders Facebook and Instagram the relevant licensees of Griner’s
photograph, not Steve King. Courts have resisted attempts to read the
license grant more broadly to apply to other users of the platforms. 107 For
instance, in Agence France Presse v. Morel (Morel II), the court considered
the question of whether the posting of a photograph to Twitter through the
app TwitPic granted a license to AFP to republish the photographs in
connection with its news stories. 108 In a nutshell, AFP’s argument echoes
King’s argument “that by posting the Photos-at-Issue on [social media], [the
photographer] subjected the Photos-at-Issue to the terms of service
governing content posted to those websites, and that these terms of service
provided AFP with a license.” 109 The court was not persuaded by the
argument, finding that the evidence did “not reflect a clear intent to grant
AFP a license” to distribute the photos in question beyond Twitter. 110 The
license was granted to Twitter, not to any random Internet user who
happened to stumble upon the photograph. 111 Although posting on Twitter
might inevitably involve some permitted re-use of the photograph, the court
was reluctant to conclude that it permitted all re-use of it. 112 Indeed, after a
close reading of Twitter’s terms of use, the court was ultimately persuaded
that the photographer was entitled to summary judgment that AFP had no
license. 113
Although King’s argument centers on Facebook and Instagram rather
than Twitter, it appears to be strikingly similar to the argument made in
Morel II; it is also likely to fail for the same reasons given the substantive
similarities among the terms of use in question. As King’s motion states, in
posting the photograph to Facebook and Instagram, “Laney Griner granted
several entities powerful licenses. Several of these entities allow third
parties to scour their web sites for content.” 114 The implication appears to
be that Griner, therefore, granted licenses to those third parties. However,
that is the exact argument that the court rejected in Morel II, finding that
Twitter’s terms of use “spell out expressly the entities to whom a license is
granted, namely Twitter and its partners,” which AFP was not. 115 King

See, e.g., Agence France Presse v. Morel, 769 F. Supp. 2d 295, 303 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
(“By their express language, Twitter’s terms grant a license to use content only to Twitter
and its partners. Similarly, Twitpic’s terms grant a license to use photographs only to
‘Twitpic.com or affiliated sites.’ AFP and TBS do not claim they are partners of Twitter or
affiliates of Twitpic licensed under the terms of service. Moreover, the provision that
Twitter ‘encourage[s] and permit[s] broad re-use of Content’ does not clearly confer a right
on other users to re-use copyrighted postings.”).
108
See 934 F. Supp. 2d 547, 559 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
109
Id.
110
Id. at 562.
111
See id.
112
See id.
113
See id. at 564.
114
King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 4.
115
934 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
107
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likewise does not allege to be aligned with Facebook and Instagram such
that the license explicitly given to the platforms should also apply to him. 116
King argues that just posting the image “to image-sharing web sites” is
enough to result in a license. 117 However, as the court in Morel II stated,
“Construing the Twitter [terms of service] to provide an unrestrained, thirdparty license to remove content from Twitter and commercially license that
content would be a gross expansion of the terms of the Twitter [terms of
service].” 118 This seems to be exactly what King is contending. The court
in Morel II concluded that the explicit nature of Twitter’s terms concerning
the copyright remaining with the original poster counsels against an
interpretation of an unrestrained license to all users to re-use content. 119 The
court determined that the statements regarding the original poster’s
retention of the copyright “would have no meaning if the Twitter [terms of
service] allowed third parties to remove the content from Twitter and license
it to others without the consent of the copyright holder.” 120
The court found that even if the terms of use permitted others to use the
content, this use was limited to the confines of Twitter. 121 Facebook
similarly defines the use of content in the terms of use on Facebook,
focusing on the interaction of the license granted by the uploading of a
photograph with the user’s specific “privacy and application settings.” 122
Instagram is even more explicit in its terms of use, specifically prohibiting
use of content uploaded to Instagram beyond its platform. 123 These terms
may allow other social media users to “like” or “reshare” a content creator’s
uploaded image. It does not, however, convey an unrestrained license in
uploaded content to all users of the Internet, as would need to be the case
for King’s behavior to be covered by this kind of license. It seems much
more likely a court would follow the Morel II precedent and find that “a
license for one use does not equate to a license for all uses.” 124 King does
King’s Motion, supra note 61.
Id. at 26. The motion’s argument is opaque on this point. It may be related to the
abandonment argument discussed supra, although presumably the mention of the social
media sites’ terms of use is meant to incorporate the licensing implications as well.
118
934 F. Supp. 2d at 562.
119
Id. at 563.
120
Id.
121
Id. at 563–64.
122
FACEBOOK, supra note 104.
123
INSTAGRAM, supra note 104 (“The Instagram Services contain Content of Users . . . .
Except as provided within this Agreement, you may not copy, modify, translate, publish,
broadcast, transmit, distribute, perform, display, or sell any Content appearing on or
through the Instagram Services.”).
124
934 F. Supp. 2d at 564. Although some courts have allowed the possibility that maybe
users taking advantage of provided platform tools could be considered sublicensees of the
platforms, even those cases have foundered on the lack of evidence of any explicit
sublicenses. See McGucken v. Newsweek LLC, 464 F. Supp. 3d 594, 603 (S.D.N.Y. 2020),
reconsideration denied, No. 19 CIV. 9617 (KPF), 2020 WL 6135733 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 19,
2020) (“Although Instagram’s various terms and policies clearly foresee the possibility of
116
117
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not allege that he took the photo either from Facebook or Instagram in the
first place, so a court is unlikely to find that the photograph was expressly
licensed to King just because it was posted on Facebook and Instagram.
King argues in the alternative that Griner provided an implied license,
both when she uploaded the photograph to the Internet and when she gave
interviews in which she expressed overall joy with the meme. 125 The
defendant in Furie, discussed above, made a similar argument based on
Furie’s public statements about Pepe the Frog memes. 126 Implied licenses
require the same elements as express licenses, including mutual assent and
consideration. 127 The court in Furie held that an original content creator’s
public statements in support of a meme cannot be considered a contractual
offer. 128 These statements are too general and lack the definiteness
necessary to establish contractual commitment. 129 Memes may be a
relatively new phenomenon, but this bedrock doctrine of licensing law is
foundational.
It is unlikely that the general statements referenced by King in his
motion will be considered sufficient to establish an implied license between
King and Griner. 130 The leading copyright treatise supports this conclusion:
“[A]n implied license requires more than a general intent of the author
regarding disposition of his work . . . . [T]he terms—including identity of
the licensee—should be reasonably clear.” 131 In Malibu Media, LLC v. Doe,
a case involving the unauthorized distribution of files uploaded to various
sites, the court found unpersuasive the defendant’s argument that the
presence of the files on the Internet “g[a]ve rise to a nonexclusive license—
extending to ‘anyone in the world’ the right to ‘copy, publish, and
distribute’ Malibu’s copyrighted works.” 132 The court “reject[ed] at the
outset any suggestion that, by placing a portion of its collection on a limited
number of [websites], [the creator] impliedly licensed every person in the
entities such as Defendant using web embeds to share other users’ content . . . , none of
them expressly grants a sublicense to those who embed publicly posted content.”); Sinclair
v. Ziff Davis, LLC, No. 18-CV-790 (KMW), 2020 WL 3450136, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. June 24,
2020). Likewise, King’s motion fails to provide any evidence of a sublicense between
Facebook and/or Instagram and King.
125
King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 26–27.
126
See Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 968 (C.D. Cal. 2019).
127
Id.
128
Id.
129
Id. at 968–69.
130
Moreover, Griner has previously sued over some uses of the photograph. See Todd
Wasserman, Boom! Success Kid’s Mom Sues Fireworks Company for Using His Image,
MASHABLE (Feb. 25, 2015), https://mashable.com/archive/success-kid-lawsuit [https://
perma.cc/DUD6-T7LB]. This suggests that Griner has not behaved as if she granted a
license for all use of the photograph, which would surely have a bearing on the court’s
interpretation of the obligations between the parties.
131
3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 10.03(A)(7) (2019).
132
381 F. Supp. 3d 343, 356–57 (M.D. Pa. 2018).
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world to download its entire collection of copyrighted materials from any
source on the Internet.” 133 With no evidence of any “communication or
relationship” between the content creator and the alleged infringer, there
was “no evidence of any statement or specific conduct by [the creator]
toward [the alleged infringer] suggesting an intent to create a licensorlicensee relationship.” 134 The court concluded that there was no implied
license and granted summary judgment to the content creator. 135 King has
likewise not alleged any communication or relationship with Griner. The
mere existence of the photograph on the Internet is not enough to constitute
an implied license to everyone on the Internet.
V. COPYRIGHT OWNERSHIP AND AUTHORSHIP OF MEMES
There are more interesting arguments to be made when it comes to
memes and copyright that are not contained in King’s motion. For instance,
the motion gestures to the collaborative nature of a meme but does not fully
engage with the implications of that collaborative nature. That is, King
contends that he integrated the Griner photograph with a number of new
elements, but he does not conclude from that observation that he had made
an important contribution to the ongoing and evolving meme such that he
could demonstrate some legitimate use. 136
Memes are an inherently collaborative form of creativity, as the history
of Success Kid makes clear. Griner cannot create a meme by herself; she
can only create a photograph. It takes the assistance of hundreds of
thousands of Internet users to make a photograph into a meme. 137 King, in
his motion, identifies this quality of memes. 138 Without users on MySpace,
Reddit, and the rest of social media using the Griner photograph to
communicate their own particular expressions, the photograph would never
have turned into the Success Kid meme. This collaborative character of
memes represents a challenge to copyright law that King’s motion does not
fully engage with. The transformation of Griner’s photograph into a meme
has effectively created two separate works: the photograph of a toddler
clutching sand and the meme representing a shorthand communication for
“success.” Griner unquestionably owns the copyright to her photograph. 139
The implicit debate in this case—and any case involving a photographturned-meme—is whether Griner also owns the meme.

Id.
Id.
135
Id.
136
See King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 30.
137
See Stacey M. Lantagne, Famous on the Internet: The Spectrum of Internet Memes and
the Legal Challenge of Evolving Methods of Communication, 52 U. RICH. L. REV. 387,
412–13 (2018).
138
See King’s Motion, supra note 61, at 4.
139
See 2 PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 3:118 (discussing photographs).
133
134
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Although the word “meme” is used on the Internet to encompass a vast
spectrum of behaviors, 140 there are some memes that take on lives of their
own. Although they may begin life as copyrighted photographs, their
transformation into memes imbues them with meaning and import that are
part of a shared cultural conversation. Ordinary photographs of a toddler at
the beach without more do not ordinarily communicate “success.”
However, one can send Success Kid to a friend without a caption and know
that it will be immediately understood as shorthand for “success.” In this
way, Success Kid is operating more like the idea of “success” than like the
initial photograph taken by Griner. One cannot use just any photograph to
communicate success. Rather, one needs Success Kid because users on the
Internet had imbued it with that particular meaning.
King’s behavior in using the Success Kid meme nicely illustrates this
point. King could have used any photograph he wanted to encourage
donations, including photographs of the toddlers in his own life. However,
King chose Success Kid for its status as a recognizable meme with
connotations of success and triumph. Indeed, in transplanting the
photograph from the beach to the U.S. Capitol, King made the “success”
meaning even more overt: he is seeking success in politics. Griner has also
acknowledged the difference between her initial photograph and the meme,
with its own meaning established collectively by the Internet. 141 After all,
her photograph was of a toddler eating sand. Initially, the Internet imbued
the photograph with a meaning related to bullying, 142 and then later, the
Internet’s interpretation equated the photograph with success. 143 In this
way, the photograph evolved to develop a new meaning in its meme context,
standing as a symbol to communicate an idea separate from its status as a
photograph. That quality of memes may render them closer to unprotectable
methods of communication than to pieces of protectable creative
expression.
The idea of collaborative authorship is pervasive throughout creative
history, from traditional folklore to Wikipedia. 144 However, intellectual
property laws “promote exclusivity and commodification,” traits that are
antithetical to the free-wheeling nature of collaborative creativity embodied
in memes. 145 Memes stand in stark contrast to traditional photographs,
where exclusivity and commodification are a more comfortable fit. The
copyright authorship test developed to deliberately limit the number of

See Lantagne, supra note 137, at 389–94.
See Complaint, supra note 44, para. 15.
142
See Lupkin, supra note 8.
143
Id.
144
See Cathay Y.N. Smith, Beware the Slender Man: Intellectual Property and Internet
Folklore, 70 FLA. L. REV. 601, 605–06 (2018).
145
Id. at 625.
140
141
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authors, which promoted this exclusivity and commodification. 146 Under
this test, the photograph is ostensibly the work of one person (the
photographer). However, pretending that the meme is also the work of that
one person is nonsensical: a meme, by definition, cannot come into
existence through the action of one individual. 147 Given the requisite
presence of multiple creators, treating the meme as closer to a piece of
folklore, unowned by any single entity and enriching the public domain,
makes sense. In the same way that the tales Beauty and the Beast and
Rumpelstiltskin evolved into their present forms over thousands of years of
modified tellings, 148 memes can be seen as the modern-day equivalent,
happening on the accelerated timeline of the twenty-first century.
Proposing that legally there is a difference between the photograph and
the meme would strike the proper balance between the two. Allowing
Griner ownership over the meme as well as the photograph would ignore
the unique value of memes as communicative tools. This could have the
effect of strangling the vibrant creative culture that results in memes. At the
other extreme, ignoring the difference between the photograph and the
meme and depriving Griner of her copyright in the photograph by finding
that she had abandoned or licensed it in the process of its becoming a meme
is likewise undesirable. This legal regime would also strangle meme culture
in that it would incentivize content creators to closely guard all content
posted to the Internet.
A middle ground can be found by acknowledging the difference
between a photograph and a meme and seeking to distribute rights according
to this difference. Factors could be developed to determine which uses
should be treated as photographic uses—requiring the consent of the
copyright holder—and which uses should be treated as memes—uses
operating outside of traditional copyright protection. In principle, copyright
would be respected when the photograph is operating as a photograph and
not as part of a meme, that is, a collaborative cultural conversation. Thus,
the use of photographs in commercial advertising and on merchandising,
for instance, would require licensure in that neither commercial advertising
nor merchandising is an expected meme usage of social media sharing and
mutation. Courts should also be careful in categorizing a photograph as also
being a meme because the sharing of a photograph on social media does not
automatically imbue it with the collaborative quality inherent in memes. But
where the photograph is operating as a meme, that is, being shared as a
shorthand collaborative communication between and among Internet users,
See Stacey M. Lantagne, Mutating Internet Memes and the Amplification of Copyright’s
Authorship Challenges, 17 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 221, 225 (2018).
147
See Shontavia Jackson Johnson, Memetic Theory, Trademarks & the Viral Meme Mark,
13 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 96, 103 (2013) (explaining that the term was
originally coined by Richard Dawkins to identify replicating units).
148
See Fairy Tale Origins Thousands of Years Old, Researchers Say, BBC (Jan. 20, 2016),
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-35358487 [https://perma.cc/JM5P-7MAG].
146

161

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL ONLINE

[VOL. 110

it should be considered uncopyrightable in that particular guise. This kind
of regime would allow traditional noncommercial meme-sharing to flourish
in the way that it has on social media while simultaneously preserving for
the copyright holder the traditional rights of exclusion and
commodification.
VI. MEMES AND COPYRIGHT FAIR USE
Even if King did not want to upend the basis of copyright authorship,
he could have asserted the defense of fair use. Given that King’s allegedly
unauthorized use served to support his political campaign, it is surprising
that his motion did not include a fair use defense. 149 Copyright fair use is a
defense to the unauthorized use of copyrighted works where the use is for
the purpose of criticism, commentary, news reporting, teaching,
scholarship, research, or some other socially valuable transformative
purpose. 150 Fair use involves a case-by-case, fact-specific analysis that
sometimes can appear to make outcomes unpredictable. 151 In order to
determine whether an unauthorized use of a copyrighted work is fair use,
courts weigh four factors:
(1) the purpose and character of the use[;] . . .
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in
relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or
value of the copyrighted work. 152

Although fair use analyses are rarely straightforward, 153 the Griner case
presents additional challenges to the fair use analysis. The first challenge is
See Cathay Y. N. Smith, Political Fair Use, 62 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2003, 2010–11
(2021). Although political speech occupies a privileged space under the First Amendment,
courts have often refused to take on an independent First Amendment analysis in copyright
infringement cases, even in cases involving political speech. See id. Instead, courts turn to
the safeguards already embodied in the Copyright Act, including fair use, to ensure that
critical speech and commentary are not suppressed through copyright law. See id.
150
See 17 U.S.C. § 107.
151
See Thomas F. Cotter, Fair Use and Copyright Overenforcement, 93 IOWA L. REV.
1271, 1284 (2008) (“Fair use . . . remains fairly unpredictable and uncertain in many
settings . . . .”); Michael Carroll, Fixing Fair Use, 85 N.C. L. Rev. 1087, 1090 (2007);
Michael J. Madison, A Pattern-Oriented Approach to Fair Use, 45 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1525, 1666 (2004) (“Fair use is an ex post determination, a lottery argument offered by
accused infringers forced to gamble, after the fact, that they did not need permission
before.”); Lawrence Lessig, FREE CULTURE: HOW BIG MEDIA USES TECHNOLOGY AND THE
LAW TO LOCK DOWN CULTURE AND CONTROL CREATIVITY 142 (2004) (“But fair use in
America simply means the right to hire a lawyer to defend your right to create.”); David
Nimmer, Fairest of Them All and Other Fair Tales of Fair Use, 66 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS.
263, 280 (2003).
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the potentially political nature of King’s unauthorized use, which can
influence the analysis of all four fair use factors and the ultimate outcome
of a fair use defense. 154 The second is the nature of the original work as a
meme, which raises important questions about the inherently transformative
nature of memes. Whether the unauthorized use is transformative is
considered under the first factor of fair use (the purpose and character of the
defendant’s use), and the determination that an unauthorized work is
transformative can affect how the court weighs the rest of the fair use
factors. 155
The first factor of the fair use analysis examines the purpose and
character of the defendant’s use of the copyrighted work. 156 Secondary uses
that are noncommercial are more likely to be considered fair use. 157 Was
King’s unauthorized use of Success Kid noncommercial? Most courts find
political uses of copyrighted works to be noncommercial uses, 158 even when
the defendant’s unauthorized use was aimed at soliciting financial
contributions to a campaign. 159 Based on case law, King has a reasonable
argument that his use of Success Kid was political and, therefore,
noncommercial. There have been a couple of courts, however, that found
the unauthorized political uses of copyrighted works to be commercial
where, for instance, the infringing use “contained links directing viewers to
the . . . campaign website, encouraging them to donate.” 160 Because that use
allowed “the Defendants [to] ‘profit[]’ from their use by gaining an
advantage without having to pay customary licensing fees to the Plaintiffs,”
the use was commercial. 161 Because King’s unauthorized use of Success
Kid linked to a donation site and appeared to be purely for the purpose of
seeking money, Griner could similarly attempt to argue that King’s use was
commercial because he profited from his use of her photograph without
paying Griner’s customary licensing fee.
In addition to the profit-nonprofit distinction, the first factor of fair use
also considers whether the defendant’s unauthorized use transformed the
See Smith, supra note 149, at 2011.
See Clark D. Asay, Arielle Sloan & Dean Sobczak, Is Transformative Use Eating the
World?, 61 B.C. L. REV. 905, 942 (2020); Rebecca Tushnet, Content, Purpose, or Both?,
90 WASH. L. REV. 869, 875–83 (2015).
156
See 17 U.S.C. § 107(1).
157
See Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994).
158
See Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1159 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (“District courts
that have actually considered whether campaign advertisements are commercial in the fair
use context come down on the side of noncommercial.”).
159
See MasterCard Int’l, Inc. v. Nader 2000 Primary Comm., Inc., No. 00 Civ. 6068
(GBD), 2004 WL 434404, at *8 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 8, 2004).
160
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1159; see also Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985) (“[T]he crux of the profit/nonprofit distinction is . . .
whether the user stands to profit from exploitation of the copyrighted material without
paying the customary price.”).
161
Henley, 733 F. Supp. 2d at 1159.
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content or purpose of the original copyrighted work by giving it a new
meaning, message, or purpose. 162 King took the image of Sam from
Griner’s photograph, superimposed it over a blurry image of the U.S.
Capitol, and added the words “Fund our memes!!!” at the top of the
frame. 163 The purpose of this unauthorized use was not to comment on
Griner’s skills or artistry, nor was it to comment on the subject matter or
person (Sam) featured in the copyrighted work. 164 Furthermore, unlike
some of the other political fair use cases involving unauthorized uses of
photographs, 165 King’s unauthorized use of the copyrighted work did not
appear to express any form of political speech or expression. It did not
transform the image with new meaning, message, or purpose. Instead,
King’s use appeared to be entirely about using a popular image to attract
attention to solicit money for his campaign.
If this case were only about King’s unauthorized use of Griner’s original
photo, the analysis under this factor might be more clear-cut. However,
meme copyright cases are complicated by the transformative nature of a
meme. As discussed above, memes often start out as a photograph or image.
The original photograph or image might have its own meaning. For
instance, the Pepe the Frog meme started out as a chill and friendly
anthropomorphic frog in a comic series and now is a symbol for hate and
white supremacy. 166 The Condescending Wonka meme started out as a
screenshot of Gene Wilder as Wonka in Willy Wonka and the Chocolate
Factory. In the original film scene, Wonka asks the excited children in his
factory, “Would you like to see?” 167 Internet users, however,
recontextualized Wonka’s “wide eyes and slight smile, frozen in time” into
a meme used to express sarcasm and insulting humor. 168 The original
images that these memes were based upon served as the “raw material” that
Internet users “transformed [to create] new information, new aesthetics,
new insights and understandings.” 169 They became memes when Internet
users collaboratively transformed those original images by imbuing them
with new meanings, messages, and social contexts and understandings. In
most cases, the meme serves a fundamentally different purpose than the
original image or photograph from which the meme is derived. 170 For
instance, Griner’s original photograph might have served the purpose of
See Campbell, 510 U.S. at 579.
See Yuhas, supra note 31.
164
See Smith, supra note 149, at 2048.
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See id. at 2018–26.
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Blanch v. Koons, 467 F.3d 244, 251–52 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting Castle Rock Ent. v.
Carol Publ’g Grp., Inc., 150 F.3d 132, 142 (2d Cir. 1998)).
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See Asay, Sloan & Sobczak, supra note 155, at 949; Tushnet, supra note 155, at 869
(“[D]efendants who made exact copies with transformative purposes (according to the
courts) have done extremely well” in fair use defenses.).
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capturing a funny moment of Sam eating sand on the beach, but as Success
Kid, it serves as an image-shorthand for humorously expressing success and
triumph. An original image and the meme derived from it serve different
purposes and often embody different meanings. But are those differences
enough to support a finding that a meme represents a transformative use of
the original image? 171 Once an original image becomes a meme, is every
use of the meme transformative within the meaning of the first fair use
factor? Or should each use of the meme continue to be analyzed on a caseby-case basis, consistent with traditional fair use analysis? These are some
of the questions that can complicate a copyright fair use analysis—and
especially analysis of the first factor—when original content becomes a
meme. In this case, even though the original photograph had become a
meme, the court is likely to analyze King’s specific use of the Success Kid
meme to determine whether his use was transformative.
The second fair use factor examines the nature of the original
copyrighted work. 172 Courts recognize “that creative works are ‘closer to
the core of intended copyright protection’ than informational and functional
works.” 173 In other words, the more creative the original work, the less
likely its unauthorized use is fair. Under this factor, some courts have found
photographic works such as Griner’s original photograph to be creative, 174
while other courts have found photographs to be primarily informational or
factual. 175 Many courts explicitly dismiss the significance of the second fair
use factor to the overall fair use balancing. 176 But should this factor carry
Cf. Andy Warhol Found. for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith, No. 19-2420-cv, 2021
WL 3742835, at *8 (2d Cir. Aug. 24, 2021) (“[W]here a secondary work does not obviously
comment on or relate back to the original or use the original for a purpose other than that
for which it was created, the bare assertion of a ‘higher or different artistic use,’ . . . is
insufficient to render a work transformative. Rather, the secondary work itself must
reasonably be perceived as embodying a distinct artistic purpose, one that conveys a new
meaning or message separate from its source material.” (citation omitted)).
172
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Henley v. DeVore, 733 F. Supp. 2d 1144, 1151 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (quoting Mattel, Inc.
v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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See, e.g., Peterman v. Republican Nat’l Comm., 320 F. Supp. 3d 1151, 1159–60 (D.
Mont. 2018) (finding the photograph to be creative and closer to the core of the intended
copyright protection where “[t]he photograph includes elements in its framing that are not
factual in nature. Instead, the Work creatively and visually develops a portrait of [the
politician] and his candidacy, including the balance of the photograph, the illuminated
cowboy hat atop [his] head, the three stage lights in the distance, and the dark background
employed.”).
175
See, e.g., Galvin v. Ill. Republican Party, 130 F. Supp. 3d 1187, 1195 (N.D. Ill. 2018)
(finding a photograph to be factual where it was a “candid image taken of [a politician] at
a political event,” which the photographer took “during a live parade” where “he obviously
did not stage the action depicted in it.” (quoting Kienitz v. Sconnie Nation LLC, 965 F.
Supp. 2d 1042, 1052 (W.D. Wis. 2013)).
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See, e.g., Furie v. Infowars, LLC, 401 F. Supp. 3d 952, 974 (C.D. Cal. 2019) (“[T]his
[second] factor has been described as ‘not . . . terribly significant in the overall fair use
balancing,’ it carries little weight.” (quoting Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353
F.3d 792, 803 (9th Cir. 2003)).
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more weight when the original work that the defendant used was a highly
used, shared, and transformed meme? As a preliminary matter, in fair use
cases involving the unauthorized political uses of a copyrighted work,
courts explicitly or implicitly consider whether the original copyrighted
work itself had a political nature. 177 If the original copyrighted work has a
political nature, such as a photograph of a politician or a political
advertisement, courts overwhelmingly find the secondary unauthorized
political use of that work to be fair use. 178 On the other hand, if the original
copyrighted work does not have a political nature, courts have been less
likely to find that the unauthorized political use to be fair use. 179 In this case,
Griner’s original photograph of Sam did not have a political nature, which
would mean that under a political fair use analysis, King’s use would not
weigh in favor of fair use. But how, if at all, should this factor account for
the status of the original work as a meme? The “nature of the copyrighted
work” (the second factor) certainly changes when original content becomes
a meme that the defendant then uses. Although the court in Furie explained
that there is no “authority for the proposition that ‘meme-ification’ of an
image or character destroys or diminishes the original author’s copyright
interest,” 180 courts analyzing the second fair use factor might consider a
different balance when the nature of the original work is a popular meme.
The third factor examines the amount that the defendant copied from the
original copyrighted work. 181 It considers both the quantitative amount that
the defendant took from the original work as well as the “qualitative nature
of the taking.” 182 It also considers whether the amount taken is justified by
the purpose of the defendant’s taking. 183 In this case, King took the heart of
Griner’s work: the image of Sam, his face, and his raised fist clutching sand.
Furthermore, King did not need to use Griner’s work to express his goal:
soliciting money for King’s reelection campaign. Fair use is not meant to
protect “lazy appropriators” but is instead meant to “facilitate a class of uses
that would not be possible if users always had to negotiate with copyright
proprietors.” 184 King, by his unauthorized use of Griner’s photograph, did
not engage with the image either politically or with its meaning or social
context. In other words, King’s unauthorized use appears to have been more
about getting attention and appropriating the connotation and
recognizability of the meme than with the sort of creative commentary that
is tantamount to true engagement with a meme. King could have chosen any
other image or created an image himself to express the same “fund my
campaign” message and did not need to use Success Kid to do so. Therefore,
See Smith, supra note 149, at 2040–45.
See id. at 2041.
179
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this factor likely weighs against King’s fair use defense. But what about
other or future cases in which a defendant chooses to use a meme because
that meme perfectly expresses the message? What if that message
appropriately uses or creatively engages with the social context or cultural
understanding of the meme? In a case like that, this factor should account
for a defendant who may not be able to express the intended message
without using the heart of the meme or the entirety of the meme.
The fourth fair use factor examines the effect of the defendant’s use on
the potential market for or value of the copyrighted works. 185 It considers
the market harm that the defendant’s unauthorized use has on the original
copyrighted work and on the potential licensing market for derivative
works. 186 Given that Griner appears to regularly license commercial uses of
Success Kid, King’s unauthorized use did deprive her of her customary
licensing fee. Furthermore, if the sort of use by King were to become a
widespread practice, it would certainly harm Griner’s ability to license the
photograph, especially her potential to license Success Kid for other
political uses. 187 Therefore, this factor would likely weigh against fair use.
At the same time, Success Kid has been used as a meme by thousands of
Internet users who did not seek Griner’s permission and did not pay her a
licensing fee. Does Griner, in fact, suffer real commercial harm from this
marginal unauthorized use? In light of King’s reputation, Griner is
understandably concerned about the potential damage and disparagement
that King’s use may have on Success Kid. But reputational harm is not the
type of harm with which courts have concerned themselves in a copyright
fair use analysis. 188 Memes are derived from but also transform the original
content that they are based upon. As discussed above, this inherent nature
of memes has the potential to complicate and alter the traditional weighing
of all four copyright fair use factors.
CONCLUSION
Laney Griner’s Success Kid journey started as an ordinary photograph
of her child at the beach and turned into a money-making asset licensed to
global corporations like Vitamin Water, Virgin Mobile UK, and Hot Topic.
Success Kid is not unique in corporations’ desire to engage with popular
memes. 189 As memes become even more common and social media
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becomes an even more valuable marketing channel, 190 commercial and
political entities will continue to capitalize on their popularity and use
memes to reach and connect with the changing demographics of their
consumers and constituents. In response, we are likely to see more disputes
involving content creators challenging commercial and political entities’
unauthorized use of their content as memes. Some creators may be
dismayed by the transformation of their content into memes, while others
may embrace that outcome. At the same time, content creators may still
wish to limit unauthorized commercial and political exploitation of their
works, especially when those works are used for ideas or causes with which
they disagree. But who owns the meme derived from an original work? Can
a content creator control uses of original content once it has become a
meme? By exploring these questions of authorship, ownership,
abandonment, licensing, and fair use of memes, this Article takes a step
toward detangling the complicated relationship between memes and
copyright.
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